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From these considerations, based upon empirical evidence and an analysis of judgments of worth, I hope to have established (1) the distinct natures of immediate value and intrinsic worth, (2) the psychological basis in cognition of all kinds of worth, (3) the adequacy of relational definitions of both value and worth, one as dyadic, the other as triadic, (4) the common form of judgments of contributory value and judgments of intrinsic worth.

I have not space to discuss in detail Mr. Urban's interesting metaphysical speculations. I would, however, instance a most unwarranted assumption that he makes. He says,²⁶ "*That a specific object has positive or negative value, as the case may be, and why it has value, are matters of interest, feeling, and desire; but that it must fall somewhere in the scale of value, this is an essential form of interest and volition as such*, logically prior to any experience of desire or feeling. Over against the world of mere objects as such are the categories of being and value, all-inclusive forms of the world." Why "of the world"? Surely, only on an assumption of the truth of idealism. As an epistemological dualist I am constrained to remark that the category of value may only be inferred to be a category or form of the judgment-process; whether or not it extends beyond the given to the world will depend upon what kind of a world we have.

I believe that I have replied to most of Mr. Urban's criticisms. It is strange, however, to read that I "describe myself as a Pragmatist with certain reservations." The agreement with pragmatism expressed in my book was restricted to one point of method. I mention this more personal matter because it affords an instance of the danger of affixing labels to philosophical standpoints which recognize that truth is not the prerogative of any single sect of philosophical opinion.

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MIND IN THE MECHANICAL ORDER

IF I have properly understood the intent of the article on "Pragmatism and the New Materialism,"¹ Professor Lovejoy's criticism is directed not altogether against pragmatism and behaviorism as such, but rather in part at least against certain philosophies which, having on some points misunderstood the meaning of these movements, have yet taken on their insignia and ended by deforming the spirit of their thought. While it is not always easy

²⁶ This JOURNAL, Vol. XIII, p. 677.

¹ This JOURNAL, Vol. XIX, no. 1.

to distinguish between the behaviorists and those who only call themselves such, I have unavoidably the impression that a part at least of the polemic is directed against some of the neo-realists, who have "joined forces" with behaviorism, rather than against the original representatives of the school itself.²

When Mr. Lovejoy proposes to the pragmatist, or to any one else, his five conundrums about the place of mind in the mechanical or "physical" order, one has a right to know what he means by his terms. "Physical" means, he says, "occupying a position in objective space and existing as a part of the sum of masses and forces dealt with by physical science." This he quotes. Does he agree to the meaning or does he even think that the statement is clear? Does any one suppose that the physical order is independent of mind? Or does not its nature change as the mind succeeds more and more in imposing it upon the world? For the mechanical order may not be absolute; it may be slowly evolved by means of the twin factors of experience and reflection. Let it not be forgotten that mass and space and time change their meaning as experience is enriched and reinterpreted; that the mechanical order of nature is not the absolute and static system it was taken to be, when it achieved its first successes. Does any one suppose that throughout the age-long effort to describe nature in mechanical terms those terms will retain their original and primitive meaning? Will mass forever and infallibly suggest the name of Galileo or Democritus, or space the name of Euclid, or time the name of Kant or Newton? To a student of the history of scientific conceptions nothing could appear more improbable, nothing could appear more *unnatural* than this.

The difficulty of a number of gentlemen who call themselves "realists" consists, or so it seems to me, in the assumption of an absolute mechanical order, which, if not grasped, is at any rate grasped *approximately*. Approximately to what? Why, to that absolute which he assumes, but about which he remains inarticulate. Let him define what he means by the *real* order of nature and I shall understand what is meant by a knowledge which approximates to it. But define it in his "sense" he can not.

Choose as an illustration, if you will, the simplest experiment to be found in the laboratory list. Suppose that your problem is to find the distance between two scratches on a piece of glass. *He* will say perhaps that there is an observed or approximate length

² The thesis that mind is describable in terms of behavior was first elaborated by Professor Singer in a series of articles in this JOURNAL; 1911, p. 180; 1912, pp. 15 and 206; 1914, p. 645; 1917, p. 337. These papers easily remain the best formulation of the behavioristic standpoint.

and there is also an absolute length, which, because of the error attached to every observation, remains forever unobserved. The real length is the limit of a series of approximations, a *Grenzbegriff*. You focus the cross wires of your micrometer microscope upon the object and you take in succession a number of readings. These readings differ *inter se*. They can not all be "true." It is meaningless to speak of any one as "correct." The arithmetical mean is the "best" approximation. Approximation to what? Why, to the *Grenzbegriff*.

Now I can understand what it means to speak of a limit to the series,

$$1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8} + \dots$$

because each term is formed from its predecessor according to a definite law. But what does it mean to speak of the limit of the fraction,

$$10.7 + 10.1 + 10.3 + \dots + (\text{the } n\text{th observation})$$

divided by n (where the numerator contains the sum of your scale readings), when n is increased without limit? Each reading bears no necessary relation to its predecessor or to its successor. Each one is *accidental* and for any finite number of readings, which is the most you can take, the arithmetical mean is *accidental* too. And so I assert that it is meaningless to speak of the limit of such a series. Or to state the general truth, of which this case is a simple exemplification, the *real* object of perception can not be conceived as *Grenzbegriff* or as the limit of a series of approximations. What these conflicting observations betray is the presence of a mind as an essential part of the total situation and not the presence of an absolute object.³

If there is no absolute object, no more can the mechanical system, in which objects are found, be taken to be absolute. Thus it is not uncommonly supposed that, while the future is in some small measure under man's control, the past must remain irrevocable and quite unchanged. "What is past is past," and "what has happened has happened," are the tautologies, which are supposed to force this truth upon us. No doubt at all about the tautology itself. But what is past and *what has happened* are exactly the matters which ever have been and will ever be in dispute, world without end. Having gone thus far I am quite prepared to go further and I shall venture to assert that the past is no more irrevocably determined than is the future. It is just as plastic, just as amenable to our

³ See the article, "A Spirit which Includes the Community," this JOURNAL, Vol. XVIII, No. 18.

interpretations. What was the azoic age, you may well say, when no one was there to observe it? *An sich* it was like nothing so much as nothing at all. It all depends upon what observer you *imagine* to have been present. It is nothing, if not the product of his experience and his reflection. To the soul of Empedocles, seated it may be these two millenniums on the rim of Saturn, it has seemed, you may be sure, a mingling and unmingling of the four elements, earth, air, fire and water, guided by the opposite principles of love and hate. To the "Copernicus of antiquity" and some of the later Pythagoreans it would have had a heliocentric cast, and to Newton it would have been without doubt a collection of masses attracting one another directly as the product and inversely as the square of the distance between their centers. Not only is the past plastic in the same sense in which the future is plastic, but it is ever being made to conform more and more to deep-lying human desires. I mean, too, that these desires, being as often as not misguided, are as constantly being given up in the light of an experience that is ever enriching itself.

There remains the question: what is the place of consciousness in a world thus mechanically ordered? Our answer must be brief, for the argument is already well known. Let one illustration suffice. I am quite unaware, of course, physiologically speaking, what a "prick" of conscience may turn out to be. In order to have before us a concrete example, which in the case contemplated is to speak medicinally, let be granted that a "prick" of conscience is the same thing as a spasm along a yard or two of the intestinal tract. Does any one suppose that the owner of this "apparatus" of conscience is the only one in a position to observe the significance of its behavior? No doubt he is favorably "placed" to interpret it as a summons to action of some appropriate sort. But is he the only one in a position to offer judgment? In point of fact the opposite is very frequently the case. His physician, or it may be his father confessor, who is privy to some shady financial transaction of his, may easily diagnose his case better than he can judge it himself. He may not even recognize his persistent malady as a prick of conscience at all. His physician, or his friend, it may be, recommends him to go and do otherwise; his malady disappears and is followed by a peace which surpasses even that small understanding which he has of himself and his world. It is nowise affirmed that a physiological description of what a prick of conscience may be exhausts all of the meaning therein contained, for such a happening may have far-reaching social and esthetic consequences. Set down in New England and become universally "bred in the bone,"

it may be fairly decisive of the character of a literature and of the domestic habits. A spasm along a yard or two of the intestinal tract may or may not be a great deal more than *just* that. This simple view, that more than mechanism can be seen in a world seen to be mechanically ordered, will yield an answer, I think, to all of Mr. Lovejoy's five conundrums.

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THE ANCIENT LANDMARKS: A COMMENT ON SPIRITUALISTIC MATERIALISM

"Remove not the ancient landmark." *Proverbs*, XXII: 28.

"*Philonous*. Tell me, *Hylas*, hath every one a liberty to change the current proper signification annexed to a common name in any language? For example, suppose a traveller should tell you, that in a certain country men might pass unhurt through the fire; and . . . you found he meant by the word *fire* that which others call *water*. . . . Would you call this reasonable?"

"*Hylas*. No; I should think it very absurd. Common custom is standard of propriety in language. And for any man to affect speaking improperly, is to pervert the use of speech and can never serve to a better purpose than to protract and multiply disputes where there is no difference of opinion."

—Berkeley, *Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, II.

In my recent philosophical wanderings I have met a surprising number of travellers who seem to mean "by the word *fire* that which others call *water*." I have, for example, encountered, in the successive spring numbers of the *Philosophical Review*, two who appear to me to play very fast and loose with the terms "spiritual" and "material." (i) One of these, Professor Sheldon, writes in defense of what he calls "positive" or "enlightened" materialism,¹ though he fills the greater number of his pages with "the indictment of materialism"² of the popular type, the description of mind and consciousness "in terms of physical process."³ In these pages Dr. Sheldon sets forth what he calls "the definite incompatibilities between admitted facts of consciousness and . . . material process."⁴ Of the specific properties of consciousness which are incompatible with the conditions of material reality he especially stresses the following: first, the "presence of the past in memory";⁵ second, the annihila-

¹ "The Soul and Matter," by W. H. Sheldon. Read as the President's Address at the December, 1921, meeting of the American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division). *Philosophical Review*, 1922, XXXI, pp. 103-134.

² *Ibid.*, p. 110².

³ *Ibid.*, p. 109³.

⁴ Pp. 128² *et al.*

⁵ Pp. 110² f.